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AGENCY-RESPONDEAT SUPEBoR-CoNThIBUTiON-INDEMNirY-EMPLOY-
Eu's LiABmrr ToWARD THE WiFE op His EMPLOYEE.-For purposes of
appeal from a summary judgment granted to defendant, the Court as-
sumed the following facts from the allegations and viewed them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff: the plaintiff, a passenger, was
injured by her husband's negligent operation of an automobile owned
by defendant corporation of which the husband was an employee and
shareholder. The accident occurred while plaintiff was assisting her
husband in preparing for an impending sales trip for defendant's bene-
fit and while her husband was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. Held: Reversed. The immunity extending to the husband for
a tortious act toward his wife does not offer a defense to the vicarious
liability of his employer. Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., 215 A.2d 427
(Del. 1965).
The Delaware court agreed with the defendant that a wife may
not sue her husband in an action at law, but disagreed with the
argument that permitting an employee's wife to sue her husband's
employer would be allowing her to do indirectly that which she can-
not do directly. This "argument of indirection" arises from the pos-
sibility that the employer could recover idemnification2 from the em-
ployee, which would not only negate the wife's recovery, but would
also reduce the family funds by the costs of the litigation,
The defendant supported his argument of indirection with two
cases, one of which3 held that the Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act4 had no application unless there was a "common liability" to the
plaintiff between the defendant and the proposed contributor. In that
case, the driver of an automobile and his guest passengers brought
suit against the adverse driver, who sought contribution 5 from the
plaintiff driver. The defendant was not permitted to recover contri-
bution because the Guest Statute6 precluded the hoses liability to the
1215 A.2d at 429.
242 C.J.S. Indemnity § 1 (1944) states, "As relating to a contract of in-
demnity the word 'indemnity' may be defined as the obligation or duty resting
on one person to make good any loss or damage another has incurred or may
incur by acting at his request or for his benefit."
3 Lutz v. Boltz, 9 Terry 197, 100 A.2d 647 (Del. Super. 1952).
4 10 DEL. CODE, ch. 63 (1953).
5 18 C.J.S. Contfibution § 1 (1939) states, "Contribution has been defined to
be a payment made by each, or by any, of several having a common interest of
liability of his share in the loss suffered, or in the money necessarily paid by one
of the parties in behalf of the others." Contribution is distinguished from in-
demnity (see note 2, supra) "in that the latter springs from a contract express or
implied, and also in the recovery, full reimbursement being sought in an
indemnity action, while only ratable or proportional reimbursement is sought in an
action for contribution."
6 21 DEL. CODE, § 6101 (1958).
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guests, thereby eliminating the requisite "common liability" between
the host and the defendant to the passengers. The second authority7
relied upon by this defendant held that a defendant was not permitted
to le a third party complaint against the operator of the car in which
the operator's wife and co-plaintiff was a passenger. The court in that
case recognized the husband-wife immunity and would have refused
to let the wife do indirectly that which she could not do directly. The
marital immunity precluded the "common liability" required by the
contribution statute, thereby defeating the defendant's plea for contri-
bution under the statute.
The Delaware court in the principal case distinguished the de-
fendant's authorities as being founded upon a statutory requirement
of "common liability," while the doctrine of respondeat superior, upon
which this case rests, has no such requirement. The defendant's
argument of indirection was further disposed of by the court's state-
ments that the employer's right of indemnity against the employee is
based, not upon the original claim against the employee for his tort,
but upon the failure of the employee to live up to his independent
duty of care owed for the protection of the employer's interest.
Clearly, the husband in the instant case is not "liable" to his wife.
Therefore, the basic question before the Delaware court was whether,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the injured party's recovery
against the employer arises from the employee's "liability" or from his
"culpability." The landmark decision9 holding the employer liable was
written by Justice Cardozo, who stated, "Others may not hide behind
the skirts of his [the husband's] immunity."10
The Delaware court accepted culpability as the basis of the
doctrine with little discussion. Whether or not this determination of
the historical foundation of respondeat superior is correct, the deci-
sion results in an extension of the doctrine, which has been accepted
in a majority of jurisdictions.1 While this extension does provide an
additional basis for holding the employer liable, conceptually it is no
more onerous than the general rule that a master is liable without fault
for the tortious acts of his servant.' 2 The same policy considerations
justifying the general rule are pertinent to this extension: (1) the
7 Ferguson v. Davis, 9 Terry 299, 102 A.2d 707 (Del. 1953).
8215 A.2d at 430. See rehearing of this case (same result) at 219 A.2d 374
(1966).
9 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42
(1928).
10 Id. at 253, 164 N.E. at 43.
11 Annot. 1 A.L.R.3d 666 (1965).
123 Am. JuR. Agency § 267 (1962); 3 C.J.S. Agency § 255 (1936); RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND), LAW OF AGENcY § 219 (1957).
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employer is better able to spread the risk as a cost of the business; (2)
the employer is encouraged to supervise the work of his employers in
the interest of safety; and (3) the injured party is assured a source of
recovery.
In its reasoning, the Delaware court makes a novel distinction be-
tween "cause of action" and "right of action." 3 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that a husband could not commit a tort against
his wife, which was based upon the common law fiction that husband
and wife are one person. Having thus established that the wife had a
"cause of action" since her rights could be infringed by her husband
and that her right to be free from harm was violated in this case, the
court then said she had no "right of action"'14 against her husband be-
cause of the marital immunity. However, the court would not leave
the wife without a remedy and accordingly said the husband's em-
ployer could be liable since the foundation of the doctrine of
respondeat superior is the employee's culpability, or wrongfulness,
rather than his personal liability.
The reasoning used by the Delaware court to determine the
foundation of the doctrine is sparse and clearly arises from policy
considerations urging that the employee's wife be provided a remedy.
In providing a means of redress to the plaintiff, the court dismissed
the possibility of indemnification against the husband of the plaintiff
in a purely academic fashion by making the distinction concerning
the duty owed as noted above. However, the Restatement of Agency 15
indicates that the employer does have a right of indemnification, and
recent cases indicate that this right is neither academic nor ana-
chronistic.' Based upon these authorities, it appears that the Delaware
court's cursory treatment of the defendant's argument was unrealistic.
A court in a recent case'7 held that a recovery by an employee's
wife against his employer should not be allowed, reasoning from the
possibility of collusion and fraud between the employee and his wife.
Certain statements made by the plaintiff in the principal case during
the course of the discovery process indicate that this reasoning is
justifiable.
The facts as derived from the briefs of the parties indicate that the
13 215 A.2d at 432.
14 Ibid.
1 5
IRFSTATEMENT (SEcoND), LAW op AGENCY § 401, comment d (1957).16 Pacific Natl Ins. Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1965);
American So. Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., Inc., 151 So. 2d 788 (Ala. 1963); Klatt
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 204 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. 1964); Sell v. Hotchdss,
141 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 1965); Smith v. Henson, 381 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1964).
17 Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965). Contra,
Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 277 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1963).
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husband's place of business lies south of and midway between his
home and the restaurant where he and his wife drank and dined
prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff and her
husband were travelling away from the interchange where they
normally turned toward the place of employment, and thus were
actually travelling away from their purported destination and toward
their home. The plaintiff explains this by stating that her husband had
missed the turn and was driving to the next interchange. The accident
occurred near midnight which was four or five hours after they had
left home, and during this period, the plaintiff and her husband were
drinking. These events would not normally be beneficial to nor planned
in accordance with, a trip made in the "scope of employment."
us
Clearly, if a wife is to recover from her husband's employer, she must
establish in some way that her husband was acting for his employer.
On facts such as these, the wife and her husband needed only to agree
that they had missed the turnoff, rather than to admit that they were
actually on their way home.
In holding as it did, the Delaware court flaunted reality in two
ways. First, the court overlooked the availability of indemnity actions,
thereby ignoring defendant's argument of indirection and failing to
foresee the real possibility of an indemnity action against the husband,
which would negate the wife's recovery. Second, cases of this type
must be carefully analyzed for the possibility of collusion and fraud.
The court must be extremely cautious in applying this rule, which now
is a moot question in Kentucky,' 9 because a husband and his wife are
so related that they may easily collude to establish that the husband
was acting within the scope of his employment.
John D. McCann
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-FREEDOM FROM ILLEGITIMATE BIRTH.-A mentally
deficient woman in a state mental hospital was raped by a male patient.
An illegitimate infant was born, on whose behalf a suit was brought
against the state. Predicated upon allegedly negligent care of the
mother, damages were sought for the stigma of illegitimacy, depriva-
tion of property rights, and loss of normal childhood and home life.
Denying the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action,
I8 EsTArEENT (SEcoND), LAW o AGENCY § 219(2) (1957).
19 The question is moot because the marital immunity no longer exists in
Kentucky. Brown v. Gosser, 202 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1958), held that a wife can
sue her husband in tort.
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